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Introduction
Copyright law is based on a balance between the need to
provide incentives and rewards to authors on the one hand,
and the need to ensure new creators have adequate access to
existing works on the other. Recent years have seen a trend
in copyright law toward extending rights for rights holders
at the expense of users and the public domain. This trend
has continued' despite extensive critique from
commentators internationally. At a normative level, debate
continues over how copyright provisions should be
interpreted in order to preserve the copyright balance, and
in order to facilitate access to copyright works, particularly
access for new creators.
A recent case from the Supreme Court of Canada
contributes to these debates. In 2004 that Court issued its
landmark copyright decision CCH Canadian Ltd v Law
Society of Upper Canada.2 The case is an important one in
relation to the interpretation of originality, authorisation,
and the fair dealing exceptions.
The Law Society of Upper Canada maintained and
operated the Great Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto, a
reference and research library and one of the largest law
collections in Canada. The Great Library provided a
request-based photocopy service for law society members,
the judiciary, and other authorised researchers. Under this
service, legal materials were copied by staff and delivered
to requesters in person, by mail, or by fax. The Law
Society also maintained self-service photocopiers in the
Great Library for use by library patrons.
In 1993 a group of publishers, CCH Canadian Ltd,
Thomson Canada Ltd, and Canada Law Book mc,
commenced copyright infringement actions against the Law
Society. The publishers sought a declaration of subsistence
and ownership of copyright in eleven specific works:
reported judicial decisions; headnotes; an annotated
Martin's Ontario Criminal Practice 1999; a case summary;
a topical index; a textbook; and a monograph. The
publishers sought a declaration that the Law Society had
infringed copyright when the Great Library reproduced a
copy of each of these works, and sought a permanent
injunction prohibiting the Law Society from reproducing
these eleven works as well as any other works that the
publishers published. The Law Society denied liability and
counterclaimed for a declaration that copyright is not
infringed when a single copy of a reported decision, case
summary, statute, regulation or a limited selection of text
from a treatise is made by the Great Library staff or one of
its patrons on a self-service photocopier for the purpose of
research.3
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision was delivered
by Chief Justice McLachlin. The Court decided the case in
favour of the Law Society. In so doing, it took an approach
to copyright law generally, and to specific provisions of
Canada's Copyright Act, that is of considerable relevance to
interpretation of the New Zealand Copyright Act. This
article reviews this approach, and compares it to existing
New Zealand judicial approaches to these issues. It argues
that the Supreme Court of Canada's approach is robust and
firmly based in copyright principle and copyright history. It
has much to offer to New Zealand Courts interpreting New
Zealand copyright law.
The Copyright Act and the Copyright Balance
In CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, the
Supreme Court first reviewed copyright principles
generally. McLachlin CJ adopted the explanation of Binnie
J in Theberge v Galerie d `Art du Petit Champlain inc4 that:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance
between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the
creator.... The proper balance among these and other
public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the
creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited
nature.
McLachlin CJ said that, in interpreting the Copyright Act,
Courts should strive to maintain an appropriate balance
between these two goals. She said that the case required the
Court to interpret the scope of both owners' and users'
rights under the Copyright Act, including what qualified for
protection, what was required to fmd that copyright had
been infringed through authorization, and the effect of the
fair dealing exceptions under the Act. The decision reflects
the Court's careful analysis of copyright policy, and
specific findings are informed by the wider normative
debates.
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Originality
On the question of originality, McLachlin CJ said that:5
Since copyright protects only the expression or form of
ideas, "the originality requirement must apply to the
expressive element of the work and not the idea".
The Judge referred to the competing views of originality in
copyright law internationally, that is, the "sweat of the
brow" theory6 as compared to the requirement of a degree
of creativity for originality.7 She held that the correct
position fell between these two extremes. She said that:8
For a work to be "original" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, it must be more than a mere copy of
another work. At the same time, it need not be creative,
in the sense of being novel or unique. What is required
to attract copyright protection in the expression of an
idea is an exercise of skill and judgment. By skill, I
mean the use of one's knowledge, developed aptitude or
practised ability in producing the work. By judgment, I
mean the use of one's capacity for discernment or
ability to form an opinion or evaluation by comparing
different possible options in producing the work. This
exercise of skill and judgment will necessarily involve
intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and judgment
required to produce the work must not be so trivial that
it could be characterized as a purely mechanical
exercise. For example, any skill and judgment that
might be involved in simply changing the font of a
work to produce "another" work would be too trivial to
merit copyright protection as an "original" work.
The Court reached this conclusion having regard to: 1 the
plain meaning of "original"; 2 the history of copyright
law; 3 recent jurisprudence; 4 the purpose of the
Copyright Act; and 5 that this constitutes a workable yet
fair standard.9
On the first factor, the Judge said that the plain meaning
of "original" suggested at least some intellectual effort, as is
necessarily involved in the exercise of skill and judgment.
The plain meaning of "original" implied not just that
something is not a copy. The Judge cited Professor
Gervais, who said that "[w]hen used to mean simply that
the work must originate from the author, originality is
eviscerated of its core meaning. It becomes a synonym of
`originated', and fails to reflect the ordinary sense of the
word".'° The Judge next considered the second factor, the
meaning of "original" in the history of copyright, and said
that the idea of "intellectual creation" was implicit in the
notion of literary or artistic work under the Beme
Convention."
On the third factor, recent jurisprudence, the Judge
noted that in recent cases some Canadian Courts had begun
to question the "sweat of the brow" She also
noted that, in Canada, as in the United States, copyright
protection does not extend to facts or ideas but is limited to
the expression of ideas. The concerns of the United States
Supreme Court in Fejst'3 about the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine's improper extension of copyright over facts also
therefore resonated in Canada. McLachlin CJ however
expressed reservations about going as far as the United
States Supreme Court in requiring that a work possess a
minimal degree of creativity to be considered original.
The Judge next considered the fourth factor, the
purpose of copyright. She held that an approach to
originality that required the exercise of skill and judgment
was in accord with the purpose of copyright, which was to
balance the public interest in promoting the encouragement
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator. She said that:'4
When Courts adopt a standard of originality requiring
only that something be more than a mere copy or that
someone simply show industriousness to ground
copyright in a work, they tip the scale in favour of the
author's or creator's rights, at the loss of society's
interest in maintaining a robust public domain that
could help foster future creative innovation. .` By
way of contrast, when an author must exercise skill and
judgment to ground originality in a work, there is a
safeguard against the author being overcompensated for
his or her work. This helps ensure that there is room
for the public domain to flourish as others are able to
produce new works by building on the ideas and
information contained in the works of others.
In relation to the fifth factor, the Judge said that
requiring the exercise of skill and judgment was a workable
yet fair standard. The "sweat of the brow" standard was too
low. It shifted the balance of copyright protection too far in
favour of the owner's rights, and failed to allow copyright
to protect the public's interest in maximizing the production
and dissemination of intellectual works. She said that the
creativity standard, however, was too high and that it
implied that something must be novel or non-obvious, and
that these concepts were more properly associated with
patent law. A standard requiring the exercise of skill and
judgment in the production of a work avoided these
difficulties and provided a workable and appropriate
standard for copyright protection, consistent with the policy
objectives of the Copyright Act.
The Judge concluded that the test for originality was
that a work must have originated from the author, not be
copied, and must be the product of the exercise of skill and
judgment that is not so trivial that it could be characterised
as a purely mechanical exercise. On the facts, all of the
works at issue were held to be original. They had all
originated from their authors and were not mere copies.
They were the product of skill and judgment that was not
trivial.
New Zealand Courts have yet to finally resolve an
approach to originality. The only direct judicial
consideration of the international debate on originality post
Feist remains the useful but ultimately inconclusive
discussion provided by McGechan J in Telecom v Colour
Pages,'6 an interlocutory injunction case concerning
originality in Telecom's yellow pages. McGechan J
considered both the Feist and the "sweat of the brow"
approaches, and concluded
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I do not think the legal position is clear at all. The
authorities are not particularly persuasive either way.
Sonic important policy elements may well need careful
consideration, not least the "sweat of the brow"
approach dismissed in the USA, but not so obviously
irrelevant under traditional English approaches. There
may be relevant economics questions. There could be
local New Zealand expectations and needs which
warrant thought....
The Court of Appeal also considered the issue of
originality in Land Transport Safety Authority of New
Zealand v Glogau,'8 and indicated that the present standard
of originality is effectively close to the "sweat of the brow"
approach. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the case
did not actually raise issues currently debated
internationally as to the test for originality in compilations
such as directories and databases where no more is involved
than collection and arrangement of common material.
However McGechan J appeared to endorse the "sweat of
the brow" approach, saying
Where the originality is low, it is to be expected that
anything other than almost exact reproduction will not
support an inference of copying amounting to
infringement, whereas where there is a higher degree of
originality in the work an inference of copying will
more readily be drawn even where the degree of
similarity is less, In this way the reward in the scope of
protection will tend to be related to the degree of
originality. Retaining a low threshold for protection
therefore presents no real harm.
In 2004, in University of Waikato V Benchinarking Services
Ltd,2° the Court of Appeal said that:2'
The threshold test for originality is not high. The
determining factor is whether sufficient time, skill,
labour, or judgment has been expended in producing
the work. As confirmed in the Wharn-O Manufacturing
case, copyright is not concerned with the originality of
ideas but with the form of their expression. As the
Court stated:
The originality that is required by the Act relates to
the manner in which the claimant to the copyright
has expressed his thought or ideas. The Act does not
require that the work be novel in form but that it
should originate from the author and not be copied
from another work.
Somewhat confusingly in University of Waikato V
Benchmarking Services Ltd, the Court of Appeal went on to
identify "a number of unusual or unique features which
clearly result from the expenditure of significant creative
effort and skill",22 suggesting perhaps a higher standard of
originality than that described. Nevertheless, New Zealand
Courts generally appear to apply a "sweat of the brow"
standard of originality.
The Ministry of Economic Development also takes the
view that New Zealand maintains a "sweat of the brow"
approach to originality in copyright law. In its 2002
Position Paper on Digital Technology and the Copyright
Act J99423 the Ministry took the view that a compilation
could be considered original for the purposes of copyright
where a database producer had contributed sufficient time,
skill and effort in selecting and arranging the data or
information.24 The Ministry considered that there did not
seem to be any need to extend protection for non-original
databases beyond protection as compilations, and
recommended retaining the status quo, on the basis that the
low threshold test for originality in New Zealand provides
adequate protection.25
New Zealand Courts are likely to be asked to confront
the originality issue more directly in coming years. The
"sweat of the brow" approach requiring only skill and
labour, without judgment, is likely to become less
sustainable internationally. While Australia retains a
similarly low standard,26 it is likely that this standard will
be reviewed, especially in light of the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The new Canadian approach to originality in CCH
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada is
thoughtfully reasoned and workable. It avoids the
difficulties associated with the very low "sweat of the
brow" standard, and is more applicable to the New Zealand
context than is the Feist decision, which depends heavily in
its reasoning on the copyright clause in the United States
Constitution. It also does not set a standard so high as to
unreasonably disadvantage authors, and it is still a standard
much lower than that required under patent law. It is an
approach entirely available within the international
obligations imposed by Berne and TRIPS, and an approach
which is congruent with copyright policy in preserving the
copyright balance. There is much to commend it to New
Zealand Courts.
Authorisation
In Canada, as in New Zealand, it is an infringement of
copyright for anyone other than the copyright owner to
authorise the exercise of the copyright owner's rights.27
"Authorise" in both jurisdictions means to "sanction,
approve and countenance".28 In CCH Canadian Ltd v Law
Society of Upper Canada, McLachlin CJ said that
"countenance" in the context of authorizing copyright
infringement must be understood in its strongest dictionary
meaning, namely, "{give approval to; sanction, permit;
favour, encourage".29 She said that authorisation is a
question of fact that depends on the circumstances of each
particular case and can be inferred from acts that are less
than direct and positive, including a sufficient degree of
indifference.30 However, she said that a person does not
authorise infringement by authorising the mere use of
equipment that could be used to infringe. Courts should
presume that a person who authorises an activity does so
only so far as it is in accordance with the law. This
presumption may be rebutted if it is shown that a certain
relationship or degree of control existed between the
alleged authoriser and the persons who committed the
copyright infringement.
The Judge considered the decision of the High Court of
Australia in Moorhouse v University ofNew South Wales."
In that case the High Court held that the provision of
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photocopiers for patrons' use in a university library
constituted authorisation. Gibbs J said that:32
[A] person who has under his control the means by
which an infringement of copyright may be
committed - such as a photocopying machine - and
who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or
having reason to suspect, that it is likely to be used
for the purpose of committing an infringement, and
omitting to take reasonable steps to limit its use to
legitimate purposes, would authorize any
infringement that resulted from its use.... Although
in some of the authorities it is said that the person
who authorizes an infringement must have
knowledge or reason to suspect that the particular act
of infringement is likely to be done, it is clearly
sufficient if there is knowledge or reason to suspect
that any one of a number of particular acts is likely
to be done.
On the facts, the university made available books and
photocopying machines, and it must have known that it was
likely that a user might make an infringing copy. It had the
power to control both the use of the books and the use of
the machines. The University did not adopt reasonably
sufficient measures to prevent infringement. Supervision of
the machines was ineffective, and no adequate copyright
notice was placed on the machines. For these reasons the
university was held to have authorised the making of
infringing copies.
McLachlin CJ in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of
Upper Canada was critical of the Moorhouse decision, and
said that it was inconsistent with previous Canadian and
British approaches to this issue. She said that the
Moorhouse approach to authorisation shifted the balance in
copyright too far in favour of the owner's rights and
unnecessarily interfered with the proper use of copyrighted
works for the good of society as a whole. On the facts she
held that the Law Society did not authorise infringement by
maintaining self-service photocopiers in the Great Library
for use by its patrons. She said there was no evidence that
the photocopiers had been used in a manner that was not
consistent with copyright law. The Law Society's posting
of a copyright notice over the photocopiers did not rebut the
presumption that a person authorises an activity only so far
as it is in accordance with the law. Further, even if there
was evidence of the photocopiers having been used to
infringe copyright, the Law Society lacked sufficient
control over the Library's patrons to permit the conclusion
that it sanctioned, approved or countenanced the
infringement.
The Supreme Court of Canada's finding is thus in
conflict with the finding in Moorhouse. The Canadian
approach is, however, reconcilable with the decision of the
House of Lords in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer
Electronics plc.33 This was a case that considered whether
the manufacture and sale of twin-deck tape-recording
machines with a tape-to-tape recording facility constituted
authorisation. In the case, Lord Templeman approved
Falcon v Famous Players Film Co,34 where it was
accepted that "authorise" meant "sanction, approve, and
countenance", and "to authorise" meant "to grant or
purport to grant to a third person the right to do the act
complained of, whether the intention is that the grantee
shall do the act on his own account, or only on account of
the grantor". Lord Templeman said that Amstrad did not
sanction, approve or countenance an infringing use of
their machine. "Amstrad conferred on the purchaser the
power to copy but did not grant or purport to grant the
right to copy."35 He distinguished Moorhouse on the basis
that while the library had control over the use of the
photocopying machine, Amstrad had no control over the
use of its machines once they were sold. Amstrad did not
grant or purport to grant the right to copy, and it made this
clear in its advertising.
The Amstrad case raised policy issues similar to those
arising in the United States in relation to other
technologies that can be used for infringing copyright,
such as video-recorders in Sony,36 and file-sharing
software allowing copying of music in Grokster,37 These
technologies are capable of both infringing and non-
infringing uses. In the United States, the fact that a
product is capable of substantial or commercially
significant non-infringing uses is an important element in
escaping liability for contributory copyright infringement.
The Canadian decision in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law
Society of Upper Canada undermines the authority of
Moorhouse in a New Zealand context. The effect of the
House of Lords decision in Amstrad was to narrow the
application of Moorhouse. It must now be in doubt
whether a New Zealand Court would follow Moorhouse,
even on similar facts, and it is argued that the reasoning in
Amstrad and CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper
Canada is to be preferred. Considerations of copyright
balance will be directly relevant in the context of a
research library where people seek access to information
for transformative uses, suggesting the need for an
interpretation consistent with the freedom of expression
right in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
Fair Dealing
In New Zealand, as in England, Australia, and Canada,
users' rights in copyright law are narrowly drafted and are
restrictive. In New Zealand, the rights are set out in the
Copyright Act 1994, Part III - Acts Permitted in Relation to
Copyright Works. Permitted acts are listed in ss 40-93.
There are provisions covering incidental copying;38 fair
dealing for the purposes of criticism, review and news
reporting;39 and fair dealing for the purposes of research or
private study.4° There are also detailed provisions covering
copying for education, copying by librarians and archivists,
public administration, and provisions relating to particular
categories of works. New Zealand has few decided cases
on the users' rights provisions.4' The decision in CCH
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada is therefore
of particular interest as it offers a broad overall framework
for interpretation, based explicitly on copyright principle.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the scope of
the Canadian fair dealing exceptions.42 The Canadian
provisions are broadly similar to the equivalent New
Zealand Copyright Act provisions.43
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The Great Library offered a custom photocopy service
under which it photocopied legal materials from its
collection on the request of lawyers, law students,
members of the judiciary or authorised researchers,
sending photocopies to the requesters. The question for
the Court was whether this service fell within the fair
dealing defence under s 29, which provides that "fair
dealing for the purpose of research or private study does
not infringe copyright."
McLachlin CJ said that, while procedurally a
defendant is required to prove that his or her dealing with
a work has been fair; the fair dealing exception is perhaps
more properly understood as an integral part of the
Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act within the
fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of
copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other
exceptions in the Act, is a user's right. She said that
maintaining the proper balance between the rights of a
copyright owner and users' interests required that it not be
interpreted restrictively. She said that, in order to show
that a dealing was fair under s 29, a defendant must prove:
1 that the dealing was for the purpose of either research
or private study and 2 that it was fair. Section 29 was
open to those who could show that their dealings with a
copyrighted work were for the purpose of research or
private study. "Research" must be given a large and
liberal interpretation to ensure that users' rights were not
unduly constrained. Research was not limited to non
commercial or private contexts.
The Act did not define "fair" and whether something
was fair was a question of fact, Citing Hubbard v
Vosper44 and the United States doctrine of fair use, the
Court approved a list of factors as a useful analytical
framework to govern determinations of fairness in future
cases. The factors to be considered although they would
not all arise in every case in assessing whether a dealing
was fair were: 1 the purpose of the dealing; 2 the
character of the dealing; 3 the amount of the dealing; 4
alternatives to the dealing; 5 the nature of the work; and
6 the effect of the dealing on the work. In relation to the
purpose of the dealing, the Judge said that the allowable
purposes under the Act were research, private study,
criticism, review, or news reporting, and these purposes
should not be given a restrictive interpretation or this
could result in the undue restriction of users' rights.
Courts should attempt to make an objective assessment of
the user/defendant's real purpose or motive in using the
copyrighted work. Some dealings, even if for an
allowable purpose, may be more or less fair than others;
research done for commercial purposes may not be as fair
as research done for charitable purposes.
The Judge said that in assessing the character of the
dealing, Courts must examine how the works were dealt
with:45
If multiple copies of works are being widely
distributed, this will tend to be unfair. If, however, a
single copy of a work is used for a specific legitimate
purpose, then it may be easier to conclude that it was a
fair dealing. If the copy of the work is destroyed after it
is used for its specific intended purpose, this may also
favour a finding of fairness. It may be relevant to
consider the custom or practice in a particular trade or
industry to determine whether or not the character of
the dealing is fair.46
In relation to the amount of the dealing, the Judge said that
both the amount of the dealing and the importance of the
work allegedly infringed should be considered in assessing
fairness. If the amount taken from a work was trivial, the
fair dealing analysis need not be undertaken at all because
the Court will have concluded that there was no copyright
infringement. The quantity of the work taken will not be
determinative of fairness, but it can be relevant.47
It may be possible to deal fairly with a whole work..
The amount taken may also be more or less fair
depending on the purpose. For example, for the
purpose of research or private study, it may be essential
to copy an entire academic article or an entire judicial
decision. However, if a work of literature is copied for
the purpose of criticism, it will not likely be fair to
include a full copy of the work in the critique.
Courts should also consider alternatives to dealing with
the infringed work in assessing fairness. Availability of a
non-copyrighted equivalent to the work should be
considered, and Courts should attempt to determine whether
the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the
ultimate purpose. For example, if a criticism would be
equally effective if it did not actually reproduce the
copyrighted work it was criticizing, this may weigh against
a finding of fairness.
A further consideration in assessing fairness is the
nature of the work. Reproduction with acknowledgement
of an unpublished work could lead to wider dissemination,
which is one of the goals of copyright law. On the other
hand, if the work was confidential, this might suggest
unfairness.49
The final factor was the effect of the dealing on the
work. Whether the reproduced work will compete with and
affect the market for the original work is an important
factor, but not the only factor nor the most important factor
that a Court must consider in assessing fairness.
On the facts, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
Law Society did not infringe copyright by providing single
copies of the publishers' works to its members through its
photocopy service. The Court found that the Law Society's
dealings with the works were for the purpose of research
within s 29 of the Copyright Act.5°
Although the retrieval and photocopying of legal works
are not research in and of themselves, they are
necessary conditions of research and thus part of the
research process. The reproduction of legal works is
for the purpose of research in that it is an essential
element of the legal research process. There is no other
purpose for the copying; the Law Society does not
profit from this service.
The dealings were also held to be fair within S 29,
having regard to the relevant factors. The Great Library's
Access Policy provided reasonable safeguards that the
materials were used for the purpose of research and private
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study. Single copies of works were provided for research.
The policy was that the Library would exercise its
discretion to ensure that the amount of the dealing with the
copyright works was reasonable. It was not apparent that
there were alternatives to the photocopy service. The
nature of the works as legal materials also suggests fairness,
because of the public interest in access to the law. There
was no evidence to suggest that the market for the works
had decreased as a result of the service. The Court
therefore found that the Law Society did not infringe
copyright by providing single copies of the publishers'
works to its members through its photocopy service,
because this service constituted fair dealing for the purpose
of research or private study within s 29.
The Supreme Court decision offers a principled
framework for interpretation of users' rights provisions. It
is a broader approach than that taken by New Zealand
Courts, but it is broadly reconcilable with the limited
existing New Zealand case law. For example, in TVNZ Ltd
v Newsmonitor,5 Blanchard J in the High Court considered
fair dealing for research or private study in relation to the
activities of a news monitoring organization. He held that
research is "clearly something of which a business
organization is capable".52 He also said that:53
A fair dealing is simply a reasonable use. What is
reasonable must be judged by looking at the nature of
the works themselves and the purpose for which the
defendant dealt with them.
Factors to be considered included the quantity of material
taken and any depreciating effect the dealing has on the
worth to the plaintiff of the work. These factors also appear
in the framework established in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law
Society of Upper Canada, but the Supreme Court of Canada
offers a more comprehensive approach to fair dealing.54
In Copyright Licensing Ltd v University ofAuckland &
0rs55 the High Court was asked to interpret specific
exceptions to copyright infringement under the Copyright
Act 1994, in relation to copying by universities. The
universities argued that other statutory provisions, including
s 161 of the Education Act 1989 giving universities
autonomy and providing for academic freedom, s 14 of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act providing for freedom of
expression, and any implied licence, were relevant to
interpretation. However Salmon J said that he did not find
it necessary to refer to external material in interpreting the
Act, and that he was able to resolve any difficulties by
considering the way in which the various provisions related
to each other. Salmon I declined to take a broad and liberal
approach to interpretation of the provisions in Part III of the
Act, but he took a purposive approach not in conflict with
the Supreme Court of Canada approach. Some aspects of
the Judge's reasoning in Copyright Licensing have been
seen as producing restrictive results. For example, Salmon
J placed emphasis on the need for a specific request to be
made where copying is done by or on behalf of a person for
the purpose of fair dealing under the exceptions. The effect
was that, under s 43, a university could make copies for
students on specific request, but it could not make copies
before the commencement of the semester without any
request from the student.56 In CCH Canadian Ltd v Law
Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
said that the exceptions should not be given a restrictive
interpretation that could result in undue restriction of users'
rights.57 However, it also said that the character of the
dealing was a factor in fairness, and that wide distribution
of multiple copies will tend to be unfair.53 On the facts, the
Law Society's copying was only undertaken in response to
specific requests. It provided only single copies of works;
there was no evidence it was disseminating multiple copies
to multiple members of the legal profession.59 The result is
therefore not in conflict with the decision in Copyright
Licensing.
New Zealand Courts could therefore useffihly adopt the
Supreme Court of Canada's overall approach in future fair
dealing cases, and this could be achieved without departing
from existing New Zealand jurisprudence. Existing New
Zealand case law on fair use is consistent with the Canadian
approach, and the New Zealand cases can be
accommodated within the Supreme Court of Canada's
framework.
The Supreme Court of Canada's approach has much to
recommend it. The Court took a robust approach to fair
use, an approach informed by the history and purpose of
copyright law. Central to the Court's reasoning was a
concern to preserve the copyright balance between
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works and providing adequate rewards for
creators. It balanced owners' and users' rights, with a
concern to maintain access as well as providing incentives
to authors, in the interests of promoting innovation overall.
It is arguable that the nature of the subject-matter in this
case - legal materials - may have had an impact on the
decision, in that access to legal materials implicates a
particular public interest in the administration of, and access
to, justice. Arguably, too, access to legal materials is of
particular interest to the judiciary. Nevertheless, the case is
not decided on those narrow grounds. In addition, the
Court did not accept the invitation to make its decision on
constitutional grounds under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. The decision is firmly rooted in the
principles of copyright law and policy. It is carefully
reasoned and authoritative, and may be seen as a landmark
decision on copyright users' rights.
The Canadian approach avoids the much-criticised
approach taken by United States Courts in interpreting the
fair use right. In the United States, s 107 of the Copyright
Act of 197660 provides that fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright. The section provides
that:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
1 the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2 the nature of the copyrighted work;
3 the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
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4 the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.
The factors are unweighted, and the provision is open to
criticism as being manipulable. Courts have given
considerable weight to the fourth factor of market harm,6'
and increasingly interpreted this factor as permitting fair
use only where "market failure" is present. This is based on
the idea that copyright exists to protect a copyright owner's
market.62 In this context, Courts have interpreted market
failure as existing where a market for the work is not
operating for technical reasons,63 or because of a copyright
owner's refusal to license,64 or because the use the
defendant will make of the work will confer public benefits
for which the user cannot pay the copyright owner.65 This
"market failure" approach has been criticised as excessively
narrowing fair use and excessively limiting users' rights, so
that the copyright balance is tilted too far toward the rights
of copyright owners.66 The Canadian approach gives some
weight to market harm, but avoids focusing on this factor to
the exclusion of other factors by emphasising the need for
balance between owners' and users' rights.
The Canadian approach also firmly establishes that fair
use is not confined to non-commercial use, and that
research carried out for the practice of law constitutes
research or private study. McLachlin CJ also made it clear
that the fact that research is done for commercial purposes
may be a relevant factor counting against a finding of fair
dealing, but it does not prevent the activity constituting
"research", and it will not alone be determinative of
fairness. This contrasts with the position in the United
Kingdom, where since October 2003 the research fair
dealing exception has been reduced to non-commercial
research only.67 This was achieved by legislation giving
effect to the European Copyright Directive.68 It is not the
position in New Zealand, where the legislative exception is
not limited to non-commercial use.
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada is a carefully
reasoned decision based on copyright history and copyright
principle. It is a decision from a Commonwealth
jurisdiction with which New Zealand has much
commonality on copyright law and policy. On originality,
it steers a middle way between the United States Feist
approach and the much criticised "sweat of the brow"
approach, and the reasoning is free of inapplicable
constitutional overtones. On authorisation, it avoids the
excessively protective approach in Moorhouse and adopts
an approach closer to that in Amstrad, an approach arguably
already applicable in New Zealand. On fair dealing, it
establishes a thoughtful framework which seeks to balance
competing rights in order to maximise the public good by
promoting innovation. It is a decision that has much to
commend it to New Zealand Courts. It is to be hoped that
the New Zealand judiciary will give it careful consideration
in forthcoming cases.
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